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The Negligence Liability of Public Authorities for 
Omissions 
 
In this article I address the question of whether the omissions principle – the principle that the common 
law does not impose liability for omissions – applies with the same force in negligence cases involving 
public authority defendants as in cases involving private defendants. My argument is that the answer 
depends upon the answer to a prior question: can a duty of care be based upon the public law powers 
and duties of a public authority? In making my argument, I refute the views both of those who insist 
that a claim in negligence against a public authority can be rejected purely because it relates to an 
omission not falling within one of the standard exceptions to the omissions principle and of those who 
insist that such a claim can succeed while at the same denying that a duty of care can be based on a 
public authority’s public law powers and duties. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
A. The Problem: the Relationship between the Omissions Principle and Public 
Authority Liability 
 
Suppose that a public authority fails to protect a citizen against some harm from 
which it is the function of the authority to protect her. Suppose, for example, that a 
police force fails to protect a citizen from a crime or that the fire brigade fails to come 
to the aid of a citizen whose house is burning. Does the fact of the authority’s failure 
being an omission exempt the authority from liability in negligence in just the way it 
would if the failure was that of a neighbour who had the capacity to render assistance 
but failed to do so? In other words, is the authority exempt from liability by reason of 
the omissions principle, the principle, that is, that the common law does not impose 
liability for omissions?  If, conversely, a court were to hold the authority liable, would 
this represent the abrogation of the principle? Would it mean that a public authority 
could be held liable wherever it had the capacity to prevent some harm to a citizen 
and failed to do so? Or would it represent some special exception to the principle? 
 
The answer I shall give in this article is that whether or not the omissions principle 
applies to public authorities as it does to private persons depends upon the answer 
given to a prior question: can a duty of care be based upon the public law powers and 
duties of a public authority? If it can then where the claim made is that the authority 
has failed in the performance of one of its assigned functions, the rationale that 
supports the omissions principle ceases to apply and the authority can be liable for 
omissions as well as acts, regardless of whether the omissions complained of fall 
within any of the principle’s established exceptions. If it cannot, then the rationale 
that supports the omissions principle applies just as it would to a private person and 
only where the omissions complained of fall within one of the established exceptions 
will it be possible for liability to arise. The aim of the article is thus deflationary or 
prophylactic. It attempts to remove the omissions principle from the prominent 
position given to it by some commentators and to redirect attention to what I contend 
is a more important issue: the relationship between the public law powers and duties 
of public authorities and the duty of care. 
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B. The Problem in Context 
 
The questions I set out above have received a fair amount of attention in recent case 
law and commentary. In Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales,1 the Supreme 
Court held that the police were not liable in negligence for their failure to intervene 
timeously so as to prevent the murder of a woman by her violent ex-boyfriend. The 
omissions principle figured prominently in the reasoning of the majority.2 Lord Kerr 
and Lady Hale dissented, however, and in doing so they cited with approval an article 
by Tofaris and Steel arguing that the principle has only limited application to public 
authorities.3 
 
It is easy to see why one might treat public authorities as not subject to the omissions 
principle. The most commonly advanced justifications for the principle are that to 
require one person to assist another is an invasion of that person’s freedom or 
personal autonomy and what Lord Hoffmann in Stovin v Wise4 called the ‘why pick 
on me?’ argument i.e. the argument that where there is a large or indeterminate class 
of people able to render assistance to a person in need, there is no reason why one 
member of the class rather than another should be held liable. Neither of these 
justifications works when applied to public authorities. Public authorities are not 
entitled to personal autonomy and where they exist for the very purpose of rendering 
the kind of assistance that a person in need requires, there is a good reason for picking 
on them. 
 
Yet opposed to this is the view advanced by Nolan in an article entitled ‘The Liability 
of Public Authorities for Failing to Confer Benefits’.5 Nolan argues that the 
distinction between acts and omissions is a fundamental one that applies irrespective 
of whether the defendant is a private person or a public authority and that the 
tendency to neglect the issue and to concentrate instead on the role of public law 
principles in negligence or on the validity of policy arguments is a mistake.6 Nolan is 
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3 
 
not alone in asserting that the rule against liability for omissions is, by itself, a 
fundamental barrier to attaching liability to a public authority in a case in which it 
causes harm by an omission. In her article ‘In Defence of the Omissions Rule in 
Public Authority Negligence Claims’7 Hannah Wilberg argues that the rule (or 
principle as I have called it) apply in the same way to private and public defendants. 
Elsewhere, one finds at various places in the literature the assertion that to allow 
liability for omissions in cases involving public authorities will undermine the 
omissions principle and lead to a state of affairs in which each of us owes a duty ‘to 
all the world’.8 
 
The view I express in this article has implications both for the arguments advanced on 
this issue by Nolan and for those of Tofaris and Steel. It means, on the one hand, that 
the omissions principle does not have the priority ascribed to it by Nolan. A claim 
based on harm caused by a public authority’s failure to act cannot be rejected purely 
on the basis that the failure is an omission falling outside the established exceptions. 
The courts must first be prepared to affirm - as they have done since the Gorringe 
case9 - that a duty of care cannot be based on a public authority’s public law powers 
and duties or, if they are not prepared to affirm this, then that a duty of care based on 
the authority’s public law powers and duties is excluded on policy grounds. So far as 
the arguments of Tofaris and Steel are concerned, my view entails that their 
promotion of the view that the omissions principle does not apply to public authorities 
is only supportable if it is seen as based on a more far-reaching proposition: that a 
duty of care can be based on a public authority’s public law powers and duties. This 
entails in turn, that the restrictive position taken in Gorringe is mistaken and that the 
courts should return to allowing the possibility of claims based on public authorities’ 
public law powers and duties as they did for the quarter century before Gorringe was 
decided. As we shall see, Tofaris and Steel stop some way short of this conclusion. 
 
 
C. The Plan of the Article 
 
As indicated above, the thesis of this article is that whether or not the omissions 
principle applies to public authorities as it does to private persons depends upon 
whether a duty of care can be based on a public authority’s public law powers and 
duties. In section 2, I explain what the view that a duty of care can be based on a 
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public authority’s public law powers and duties entails and examine the converse 
view that a duty of care cannot be based on a public authority’s public law powers 
and duties. In section 3, I review the question of what an omission is and the rationale 
for the omissions principle. In section 4, I bring the arguments of the preceding two 
sections together to make good the article’s basic thesis. The remainder of the article 
is devoted to rebutting views that conflict with the position reached in section 4. In 
section 5, I address arguments to the effect that the omissions principle applies to 
public as it does to private defendants irrespective of the differences between them. A 
touchstone for commentators propounding this view is Tony Honoré’s well known 
essay ‘Are Omissions Less Culpable?’10 I shall argue that this essay does not show 
what it is believed to show and that the conclusions of the previous section therefore 
remain unscathed. In section 6, I criticise Tofaris and Steel’s approach to the 
omissions problem on the ground that they studiously avoid the conclusion I argue for 
in the rest of the article, namely that public authorities are exempt from the omissions 
principle just to the extent that it is possible to impose on them duties of care 
continuous with their public law powers and duties.11  
 
 
 
2. The Relationship between a Public Authority’s Public Law Powers 
and Duties and the Duty of Care 
 
In Gorringe, Lord Hoffmann, with whom the other members of the House of Lords 
agreed said, ‘I find it difficult to imagine a case in which a common law duty can be 
founded simply upon the failure (however irrational) to provide some benefit which a 
public authority has power (or a public law duty) to provide.’12 Lord Scott went 
further:13 
In my opinion, if a statutory duty does not give rise to a private right to sue for 
breach, the duty cannot create a duty of care that would not have been owed at 
common law if the statute were not there. If the policy of the statute is not 
consistent with the creation of a statutory liability to pay compensation for 
damage caused by a breach of the statutory duty, the same policy would, in my 
opinion, exclude the use of the statutory duty in order to create a common law 
duty of care that would be broken by a failure to perform the statutory duty. I 
would respectfully accept Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s comment in X (Minors) 
v Bedfordshire County Council, at p.739, that ‘the question whether there is 
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such a common law duty and if so, its ambit, must be profoundly influenced 
by the statutory framework with which the acts complained of were done.’ But 
that comment cannot be applied to a case where the defendant had done 
nothing at all to create the duty of care and all that is relied on to create it is 
the existence of the statutory duty. In short, I do not accept that a common law 
duty of care can grow parasitically out of a statutory duty not intended to be 
owed to individuals. 
 
To see how a common law duty of care can be founded on the failure to provide some 
benefit which a public authority has a power or duty to provide – or ‘grow 
parasitically’ out of such a power or duty – it is helpful to look back to the case to 
which Gorringe was a kind of sequel, Stovin v Wise.14 The latter, it will be recalled, 
concerned a road accident at a junction. The plaintiff suffered injury when a car 
emerging from a side road knocked him from his motorcycle. Part of the reason for 
the accident was that at the junction in question, the motorist’s vision was obscured 
by the presence of a mound of earth. The plaintiff brought his action against both the 
motorist and the highway authority, Norfolk County Council. The latter had powers 
under the Highways Act 1980 to serve a notice requiring the occupier of the land on 
which the mound was situated to remove it in order to improve the safety of the 
junction. It had, in fact, planned to do this work itself but had failed, apparently 
through pure inadvertence, to execute its plan. 
 
The case raised in an especially clear form the problem of whether a duty of care can 
be founded on a public authority’s public law powers and duties. If the highway 
authority were treated as if it were a private person then there were no grounds for 
imposing a duty of care. The Highways Act provided the authority with a panoply of 
powers for dealing with dangers, obstructions and inconveniences on the highway and 
the power to order removal of the mound was one of these. It also had a duty under 
the Act to maintain the highway itself. But there was no explicitly stated duty to 
remove obstructions to vision at junctions nor any more general explicit duty to deal 
with dangers and obstructions. On the facts of the case, there was thus no duty of the 
sort that could form the basis of an action for breach of statutory duty. 
 
In circumstances of this type, the only justification for imposing a duty of care is that 
the common law duty of care gives effect to a public law duty, the latter not to be 
found in terms in the governing statute but itself imposed upon or ascribed to the 
authority on the basis of an exercise in statutory interpretation undertaken by the 
court. In a case involving a highway authority’s power to remove dangers, 
obstructions and inconveniences on the highway, such as Stovin, the exercise would 
involve something like the following. A highway authority has many such powers. 
Clearly it is given these powers for a purpose. It is not at liberty to shirk their use and 
to simply ignore problems on the highway that they might be used to solve. One way 
of expressing this would be to say that the authority has an overarching duty to make 
the highway safe, even though no such duty is expressed in terms in the governing 
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statute.15 A duty of this sort would be a target duty leaving a great deal of discretion to 
the authority as to how to fulfil it. Nonetheless, in the light of this overarching duty or 
purpose, a court will sometimes feel it appropriate to find that the authority ought to 
exercise one of its powers, generally on the ground that not to do so would be 
irrational. On the facts of Stovin itself, it was arguably irrational for the authority, 
having identified the danger at the junction and having put on foot a scheme for its 
removal, not to do so. On this basis, it would have been possible to find a public law 
duty to complete the scheme but also, since not completing the scheme entailed the 
possibility of foreseeable harm, a duty of care. The content of the public law duty and 
the duty of care would have been identical. 
 
In his judgment in Stovin, Lord Hoffmann recognized the possibility that a duty of 
care could be imposed on the basis of reasons like those I have set out in the previous 
paragraph. He thought that a duty of care could be based on the existence of a 
statutory power if ‘it would in the circumstances have been irrational not to have 
exercised that power, so that there was in effect a public law duty to act’.16 He also 
thought, however, that for there to be a duty of care it would have to be required by 
what he called the ‘policy of the act’. Where the act did not contain a duty of the sort 
capable of giving rise to an action for breach of statutory duty, there would have to be 
exceptional grounds for holding, despite this absence, that a duty of care was 
appropriate. On the facts of the case he found that there were no such grounds and 
also that the authority’s failure to carry out its scheme of improvement was not 
irrational. 
 
The majority agreed with Lord Hoffmann. By contrast, Lord Nicholls (with whom 
Lord Slynn agreed) was prepared in his dissenting speech to take up the idea of a duty 
of care identical with the authority’s public law duty and to develop it. The authority, 
he found, ‘acted in a way no reasonable authority would have done’ and ‘failed to 
fulfil its public law obligations just as much as if it were in breach of a statutory 
duty.’17 In principle, there was no difficulty in imposing a duty of care because, ‘the 
extent of the obligation would march hand in hand with the authority’s public law 
obligations.’18 Lord Nicholls accepted that a significant feature of the case was the 
absence of any indication that Parliament intended there to be a right of action for 
failure to fulfil the duties in the statute. He thought this feature pointed away from 
there being a concurrent common law duty sounding in damages. He also thought, 
however, that there could exist special circumstances that would overcome this 
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obstacle and establish proximity between authority and plaintiff.19 On the facts of the 
case, he found that these were present.20  
 
A similar style of reasoning to that adopted by Lord Nicholls in Stovin is to be found 
in the judgements of Lord Woolf in the Court of Appeal in Kent v Griffiths21  and 
Larner v Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council22 and in the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal without Lord Woolf in Gorringe.23 The essential ingredients that make up the 
approach adopted by Lord Nicholls in Stovin and emulated in the cases mentioned 
may be summarised as follows. In each case there is no relationship between claimant 
and defendant capable of giving rise to a duty of care on ordinary private law 
principles. In each case the defendant public authority has statutory powers. The 
governing statute contains no duty of the sort capable of giving rise to an action for 
breach of statutory duty. The court, however, by reference to overarching target duties 
contained in the governing statute or on the basis of a global analysis of the purposes 
for which the authority’s powers are granted or both, holds itself able to ascribe duties 
to the authority and, on the facts of the case, finds a duty owed to the claimant breach 
of which has caused foreseeable harm. This public law duty is then identified with a 
duty of care in negligence. 
 
There are two complementary ways of looking at this approach. One is to see it as   
tacitly underpinning the law in this area during the whole period inaugurated by the 
House of Lords’ decision in Anns v Merton Borough Council24 and ending with 
Gorringe. In Stovin, Lord Nicholls was quite clear about the significance of Anns in 
this respect. Before 1978, he said, it had not been possible to find a public authority 
liable in negligence for failure to exercise a statutory power. The decision in Anns, 
however, ‘liberated the law from this unacceptable yoke’25 and ‘articulated a response 
of growing unease over the inability of public law, in some instances, to afford a 
remedy matching the wrong. Individuals may suffer loss through the carelessness of 
public bodies in carrying out their public law functions. Sometimes this evokes an 
intuitive response that the authority ought to make good the loss.’26 
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Since the approach I describe here was not explicitly articulated before Stovin, the law 
between Anns and Gorringe only embodies it very imperfectly and to treat it as 
justification for that law clearly involves a degree of interpretative licence. Perhaps in 
part because of the lack of a fully articulated justification, the courts were not at ease 
with what they had done in Anns and often sought to avoid its consequences by 
invoking policy considerations.27 It is not altogether surprising, in this respect, that 
not many years separate Lord Nicholls’ adumbration of a public law-based 
justification for Anns from the decision in Gorringe to close altogether the door that 
Anns had opened. 
 
The second way of looking at the approach I have described is as a blueprint and 
guide to the future. If one wanted a theoretical justification for this, it would go 
something like the following. Public authorities are given special powers in order to 
serve the public, both the general public as a whole and, in some cases, individual 
members of it. A special body of law, public law, exists both to facilitate the 
performance by public authorities of their functions and to hold them to account by 
ensuring both that they fulfil their duties and that they do not exceed their powers.  
Where a public authority harms an individual citizen either by acting in excess of its 
powers or by failing to fulfil a duty that it owes to an individual citizen, the same 
remedy is appropriate as would be appropriate if one private person had harmed 
another, namely compensation or damages. In a system which has not traditionally 
made a clear distinction between public and private law and in which private law 
proceedings can be used to question the public law lawfulness of acts and omissions 
of public authorities, there is no reason not to use the law of tort to provide this 
remedy. 
 
To defend this justification and to draw out all the implications of the approach it 
supports would require more space than is available here and since my purpose in 
outlining it is to describe its relation and that of its opposite to the omissions principle, 
I turn next to the omissions principle’s rationale.28 Before I do so, however, two 
features of the approach are worth touching on since they are relevant to the argument 
that follows. Firstly, I mentioned above the courts’ practice in the years following 
Anns of eliminating by means of policy considerations the possibility of a duty of care 
that Anns seemed to promise.  The public law-based approach considered here is not, 
however, incompatible with the use of policy considerations to limit the incidence of 
the duty of care as long as this is genuinely done to prevent the bad consequences that 
imposing a duty of care might have in particular cases rather than to thwart the 
approach altogether. Secondly, since the justification adverts to the special powers 
possessed by public law bodies generally there is no need to think of the approach as 
being exclusively concerned with public bodies’ statutory powers and duties: where, 
as in the case of the Crown or the police, a body had significant common law public 
powers, the approach could licence the derivation from these of a duty of care.  
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3. The Omissions Principle 
 
 
A. What is an Omission? 
 
I begin with the definition of an omission. As Honoré has said, if omissions were to 
be defined by reference to the rationale underpinning the omissions principle, then it 
would be true tautologically that an omission was something that could not give rise 
to liability.29 In order, therefore, to give the rule substance it must be possible to 
identify some neutral distinction between action and inaction that is independent of 
the rationale. 
 
The key non-normative notion is that of inaction, in the sense of absence of bodily 
movement, that gives rise to harm i.e. in relation to which it is possible to say that a 
given instance of harm would not have occurred if the person whose inaction is in 
issue had acted. This notion encompasses both the case of the passer-by who does 
nothing to save a child drowning in shallow water and of the person who does not 
take advantage of the opportunity to walk up to a stranger in the street and offer him a 
$100 bill.30 An omission is a case of inaction in relation to which there is some reason 
to assert that the non-actor ought to have acted. In relation to the examples just given, 
the first but not generally the second would be thought of as an omission since most 
of us would recognize, at least, a moral duty to assist a dying child while most of us 
would deny the existence of an obligation to give money to random strangers.31 
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B.  The Rationale of the Omissions Principle 
 
The rationale for the principle that omissions do not give rise to liability is correctly 
expressed in the first two reasons given by Lord Hoffmann in the Stovin case 
mentioned above:32 the first reason is that requiring people to act affirmatively so as 
to assist others constitutes a greater inroad on their liberty than requiring them to 
refrain from acting so as to harm others; the second is what Lord Hoffmann calls the 
‘why pick on me’ argument i.e. the fact that there often appears to be no principled 
way of confining the class of persons who should be subject to an affirmative duty or 
of deciding which members of the class should bear it.33  
 
Honoré attempts to explain the omissions principle in utilitarian terms.34 He suggests 
that we sanction acts more severely than omissions because abstaining from harmful 
action requires less effort than acting positively to assist others while the effects of 
abstention are more widely distributed than the effects of positively providing 
assistance. Thus it is easy to refrain from poisoning others and it benefits everyone, 
whereas for an individual to provide food to a starving person might be onerous and 
would benefit only the individual assisted. The implication is that the net benefit is 
greater when we require people to refrain from harmful action than it is when we 
require people to assist others. It is not hard, however, to think of situations where this 
is not the case. A rule requiring ships in fog to sound their horns presumably has 
greater net benefit than a rule that simply requires them to avoid hitting each other. 
Kortmann invites us to consider the example of a busy road blocked by an 
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keeping their windows closed, the economic approach would forbid a finding that the factory was 
liable. If the person who should take steps to avoid accidents or other social harms is the ‘cheapest cost 
avoider’, it is hard to see why this person should not be someone who could positively intervene so as 
to prevent the harm as well as someone who could avoid the harm by refraining from action. Of course, 
to require each person to assist another where her doing so was cheaper than requiring the creator of 
the harm to take greater care or the victim to bear the loss might create an unmanageable burden and so 
there would have to rules to decide under what circumstances a given person should be under an 
affirmative duty. This just takes us back to the Feinberg argument described in the text above. For basic 
exposition of the economic approach see e.g. R Posner Economic Analysis of Law (9th edn, Kluwer, 
2014) chapters 1 and 6; G Calabresi The Cost of Accidents (Yale, 1970); P Cane Atiyah’s Accidents, 
Compensation and the Law (8th ed, Cambridge UP, 2013) pp 435-55. For a discussion of the 
application of the economic approach to the problem of omissions, see J Kortmann Altruism in Private 
Law: Liability for Nonfeasance and Negotiorum Gestio (Oxford: OUP, 2004) pp 18-23. 
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unconscious person.35 The total social cost of requiring one driver to remove the 
unconscious person is lower than the social cost of requiring each driver to steer 
round her. What does seem clear is that subjecting each of us to myriad duties to help 
others would create an unsustainable burden. This brings us back to Lord Hoffmann’s 
explanations of the principle. The second of these is usefully elaborated by Feinberg 
who points out that requiring each of us to render assistance whenever we were able 
to would not only impose an excessive burden but would create confusion.36 This is 
not, Feinberg argues, a reason for denying the existence of a duty on society as a 
whole to assist those in need but the task of providing that assistance is divided up on 
the basis of social rules about who must help whom in which circumstances. As a 
consequence, we do not usually feel obliged to come to the aid of others unless 
required to do so by these rules. 
 
The standard exceptions to the omissions principle must be understood as cases in 
which the rationale for the principle does not apply or in which there are 
countervailing considerations that override it in the particular case. In each, some 
factor is present that overcomes the objection that to impose a legal duty to act 
represents too great an inroad on the liberty of the duty-bearer and each is an example 
of the way in which the law, by coordinating the allocation of responsibility, avoids 
the problems that would arise from imposing on each of us a duty to assist others in 
all circumstances. Where someone has created a harm or a risk of harm, there is a 
clear reason to ‘pick on’ that persons as the one who must mitigate or avert it. Doing 
so involves making an inroad on the harm creator’s freedom but it is a justified one 
since taking responsibility for the effects of one’s actions is a necessary incident of 
freedom. Where a person is obliged to act positively because she has made an 
undertaking then there is a clear reason to pick on her and there is no inroad on her 
freedom because she made the undertaking voluntarily. Where an affirmative duty is 
attached to some role or status, this involves no inroad on freedom since the role or 
status will generally have been assumed voluntarily in the knowledge of what it 
entails. The attachment of affirmative duties to particular roles or statuses illustrates 
especially clearly, moreover, the way in which the general duty to assist others or to 
avert social harms is parcelled out among individuals. Hence school teachers are 
made responsible for the welfare while in school of school children, and to some 
extent also, for preventing the harm that they may cause others; prison officers are 
responsible for the welfare of prisoners and for preventing the harm the prisoners may 
cause if they escape; a lifeguard is responsible for saving swimmers who get into 
trouble; and a landowner has an affirmative duty to deal with a danger or nuisance 
that originates on her land. As Feinberg argues, in each of these cases, members of the 
public who do not occupy such positions feel themselves exempt from the affirmative 
duties that occupancy of the positions entails precisely because they know that those 
duties have been apportioned to others. 
 
In this context, Honoré makes an important distinction. He distinguishes between 
background duties, ‘which we owe to all’37 and distinct duties, which are ‘duties to 
                                                 
35
 Kortmann n 33 above at 19-20.  
  
36
 Feinberg n 30 above, 169-171. 
 
37
 Honoré n 10 above p 33.  
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other people and associations, including the state, which vary from person to person 
according to past dealings between them.’ At the background level, there is no duty to 
help others. There are, however, duties to avoid harming others. We might say that the 
possibility of causing harm to another creates a relationship with that other and that 
this makes the imposition of a legal duty feasible and appropriate. The duties 
described in the previous paragraph as constituting exceptions to the omissions 
principle are examples of distinct duties.38 According to Honoré, where a person owes 
a distinct duty it cannot be assumed that an omission is worse than an act and there 
may therefore be no reason for the omissions principle to apply. Hence it is as bad for 
a parent to starve a child as to beat it39 and it may be as bad for a doctor who has 
undertaken to treat a patient to fail to administer medicine as to give the wrong 
medicine.40 Honoré also observes that ‘distinct duties are stronger than the 
background duties we owe to everyone and take priority over them.’41 He does not 
illustrate this assertion but an example might be, presumably, that a parent’s duty to 
protect her child from physical harm outweighs her duty to avoid causing physical 
harm to a passer-by in the street. 
 
The omissions principle is, in essence, a doctrine about background duties. It involves 
repudiation of the principle advanced by some moralists that we are all under an 
obligation to help anyone who might benefit from our assistance even if it at 
significant cost to ourselves.42 Or to be more precise, it involves repudiation of the 
idea that it is the function of the law to enforce such an obligation. We may, morally 
speaking, have obligations of that sort but the law leaves it to the conscience of 
individuals to decide whether they wish to act on those obligations and values the 
freedom of the individual over the claims of those in need of assistance.  
 
Honoré’s distinction between distinct and background duties helps us see that where it 
is argued that a particular type of omission should give rise to liability, the argument 
often rests not on the claim that we owe ‘a duty to all the world’ but on the claim that 
the circumstances in question give rise to a distinct duty. This is so, I suggest, in 
relation to the vexed case of easy rescue. The typical proponent of the view that there 
should be a duty to undertake easy rescue is not suggesting abolition of the 
act/omissions distinction, wholesale rejection of the omissions principle or that the 
potential rescuer owes a duty to all the world. Rather, the proponent is suggesting that 
where a small number of passers-by are in a position to rescue a person in difficulty 
without great danger to themselves, they owe a distinct duty to that person. The 
imagined circumstances are, after all, such as to defeat the reasons for not allowing 
                                                 
38
 Honoré’s reference to ‘past dealings’ might be taken to indicate that distinct duties are only those 
that arise as a result of some form of voluntary undertaking but it is clear from the rest of his essay that 
he means the expression to refer to the range of generally recognized exceptions to the omissions 
principle. 
 
39
 Honoré n 10 above p 33. 
 
40
 Ibid pp 48-49. 
 
41
 Ibid p 33. 
 
42
 As for example in Peter Singer’s claim that we should all help people in poorer countries up to the 
point at which the loss to us outweighs the gain to them: see P Singer ‘Famine, Affluence and 
Morality’  (1972) 1 Philosophy and Public Affairs 229. 
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liability for omissions: only a small number of people are eligible to be bearers of the 
duty and the requirement to effect the rescue does not constitute a significant inroad 
on their liberty.43 As I shall argue below, the claim that a public authority should be 
liable for an omission is nearly always based on the idea that it owes a distinct duty in 
Honoré’s sense. 
 
 
 
4. Public Authorities and the Omissions Principle 
 
In part B of the introduction to this article, I outlined some reasons for thinking that 
the rationale underlying the omissions principle does not apply to public authorities. 
The significance of this needs to be spelled out more precisely, however.  As a 
general proposition, it is not true that the rationale does not apply to public authorities. 
At the level of background duties, it does apply. Public authorities do not owe ‘duties 
to all the world’. They are not obliged to help people just because, as a practical 
matter, they might be capable of doing so. No one claims, for example, that the fire 
brigade should be liable for harm caused by failure to apprehend criminals or that the 
ambulance service should be liable for harm caused by failure to paint markings on 
the road warning of dangers or that a social services department should be liable for 
harm caused by failure to spot the signs of dyslexia in a child, even though one can 
imagine circumstances in which each type of authority might be in a position to avert 
harms of the sort mentioned. It is true, as I emphasized in my introduction, that public 
authorities have no personal interest in freedom and hence that one part of the 
rationale for the omissions principle might appear not to apply to them. Against this, 
however, public authorities are bound by public law to use their powers only for the 
purposes for which they were granted. They cannot therefore be required or – what is 
tantamount to the same thing – held liable for failure to use their powers in ways alien 
to these purposes. 
 
It is in relation to certain types of distinct duty that the argument outlined in the 
introduction is accurate. A public authority can be liable for an omission that falls 
within one of the traditional exceptions to the rule against liability for omissions. This 
is so, at least, where to hold the authority liable would not involve the implication that 
it ought to have acted in a way contrary to its assigned purpose.44 The focus of the 
argument outlined in the introduction is different, however. It relates precisely to the 
type of case discussed in section 2 above in which the court ascribes to the defendant 
public authority an overarching duty or purpose and on this basis deduces the 
                                                 
43
 It is not my intention, however, to argue that there is a case for a duty of easy rescue. The argument I 
wish to make in this article does not depend on showing that there is. My argument is, rather, that in 
order to support a duty of easy rescue it is not necessary to undermine the omissions principle but 
merely to make an exception to it; and that, in the say same way, the best argument for public authority 
liability for omissions falling outside the established exceptions involves making another exception to 
the principle rather than undermining it. 
 
44
 Barrett v Enfield LBC [1999] 3 WLR 79, HL and Phelps v Hillingdon LBC [2000] 3 WLR 776, HL 
are examples of the kind of case in which the defendant authority can in principle be held liable for an 
omission since the omission in question falls within one of the standard exceptions; and in which, at the 
same time, the duty of care that the authority would be thereby held to have breached is entirely 
consistent with the authority’s public law obligations. 
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existence of other more particular duties owed to particular persons. Where a public 
authority has failed to do the kind of thing that it exists to do, there is no danger that 
by imposing liability the court will require it to act in a way contrary to its assigned 
purpose (this being, as we saw above, the equivalent in the case of public authorities 
of the consideration that liability for omissions represents too great an inroad on the 
freedom of private persons). And because, again, it is the function of the authority to 
assist the claimant, there can be no ‘why pick on me’ objection to making it liable. 
Thus if it is possible to superimpose a duty of care on a statutory – or more generally, 
public – power or duty, then the objections to liability for an omission are overcome. 
 
In the light of this it is no surprise that some of the leading cases that can be explained 
in terms of the approach described in section 2 involve omissions. In the Anns case,45 
for example, and in X (Minors) v. Bedfordshire CC,46  the possibility of liability for 
omissions was accepted even though the omissions in question did not fall within any 
of the traditional exceptions to the omissions principle. In neither case was the 
omissions principle itself discussed. This lack of discussion was not the result of a 
dereliction of duty on the part of the courts.47 It reflected the fact that the primary 
issue in these cases was whether the authorities’ statutory powers and duties to assist 
the claimants gave rise to a duty of care to do so. 
 
By the same token, the significance of the Gorringe case does not lie in the fact that it 
restores the omissions principle to its proper position of salience. It lies in the fact that 
it excludes the possibility of basing a duty of care on a public authority’s public law 
powers and duties. This entails in turn that the only factors that can militate in favour 
of imposing a duty of care are those that would apply irrespective of whether the 
defendant were public or private. And it is only as a side effect of this, that in the 
present state of the law, a court wishing to impose a duty of care in respect of an 
omission must show that the omission in question falls within one of the established 
exceptions. Were we to revert to the position that pertained between the Anns case 
and Gorringe, then it would again be possible to make an exception to the omissions 
principle that related specifically to public authorities. 
 
This is the basic answer to those writers mentioned in the introduction to this article 
who insists that the omissions principle must always apply in the same way whether 
the defendant is private or public. Nolan claims that attention to whether a public 
authority has brought about the harm complained of via an act or an omission should 
precede or take priority over consideration of public law principles or policy 
arguments. But it is the answer to the latter two questions that will determine how the 
omissions principle applies. Similarly, Wilberg identifies a set of criteria that are 
supposed to determine whether there can be liability for an omission in relation to 
both public and private defendants. But this makes it impossible to see why there is 
sometimes – as Lord Nicholls put it – an intuitive response that a public authority 
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 n 24 above. 
 
46
 n 27 above. 
 
47
 Contrary to the criticism made by Bailey and Bowman of the reasoning in the Anns case in 
‘Negligence in the Realms of Public Law’ n 31 above.  
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should have acted to assist someone when the same response is lacking in relation to a 
private person who might have been equally able to assist.48 
 
 
 
5. Counterarguments 
 
This is not all there is to be said, however, on the question of whether the omissions 
principle applies in the same way to private and to public defendants. Neither Nolan 
nor Wilberg accept that the kinds of reasons I advanced as justifying the omissions 
principle – the first and second reasons set out by Lord Hoffmann in Stovin – provide 
sufficient explanation. Both insist that the principle must have some deeper 
significance that explains why it should cut across the distinction between public and 
private. In support of this view, Wilberg invokes the claim that omissions are causally 
peripheral. For the same purpose, both Wilberg and Nolan pray in aid Tony Honoré’s 
claim that omissions are in general less harmful than acts. Both these claims are 
mistaken. In this section I attempt to show why. 
 
 
A.  Omissions are Causally Peripheral 
 
The claim that omissions are causally peripheral originates in an article by Jane 
Stapleton49 and is a central plank of the Wilberg article referred to above.50 Wilberg 
asserts that an omission’s status as causally peripheral is part of what defines it as an 
omission and entails that special requirements must be satisfied if liability is to arise. 
The implication is of some basic difference that is deeper than the bare difference 
between action and inaction and that both helps us distinguish omissions from acts 
and explains why it is generally not appropriate to attach liability to the former.  
 
By describing omissions as causally peripheral, Wilberg means that in the typical 
omissions case, the defendant will have failed to protect the claimant from some harm 
and this harm will have been more directly caused by some third party or perhaps by 
some natural phenomenon. On this view, the defendant’s failure to act will be a cause, 
but a secondary or, as it is put, peripheral one. One has only to think of the case in 
                                                 
48
 The criteria identified by Wilberg include a set of exceptions to the omissions principle roughly 
equivalent to the standard set and she counts amongst these the possession by the defendant of special 
powers of control over the risk giving rise to the harm to the claimant. She considers the argument that 
the main justifications advanced for the omissions principle (the ‘liberty’ and ‘why pick on me’ 
arguments) do not apply to public authorities and replies that this objection is overcome by the 
consideration that, in appropriate cases, public authorities can be made liable for omissions that fall 
within her set of exceptions, especially the control exception. As noted in the text, however, it is not 
possible to see why on this view there is sometimes an argument for making a public authority liable 
when the same argument would not be made in relation to an analogously situated private person. Why, 
for example, might we argue that the police in Michael should have been liable when we might hesitate 
to argue the same in relation to a neighbour who would have been in as good a position to assist but did 
not do so? See further the arguments in section 6 below. 
 
49
 J Stapleton ‘Duty of Care: Peripheral Parties and Alternative Opportunities for Deterrence’ (1995) 
111 LQR 301. 
 
50
 Wilberg n 7. 
 
16 
 
which the police are blamed for failing to prevent a crime or the fire brigade for 
failing to put out a fire to see what is meant. Classifying omissions as causally 
peripheral adds little to what I have already said in this essay about the reasons for the 
omissions principle, however. Nor does it provide any reason to think that the 
omissions principle need restrict the liability of public authorities more than I have 
already suggested it does. 
 
The idea that an omission can only be a cause in a secondary and inferior sense 
reflects the view that to cause something always involves active participation in 
bringing it about.51 But while it is true that in ordinary usage, we are more inclined to 
say that someone who omits to protect another has failed to prevent harm than that 
they have caused it, in law it is accepted that omissions cause harm and most theorists 
of causation strongly affirm this position.52 Since it is clear that omissions can be 
causes-in-fact, the only grounds for treating them as belonging to a lesser variety of 
cause must be normative ones. To see what those might be, it is helpful to look at the 
article by Stapleton on which Wilberg draws.53  
 
Stapleton suggests that certain defendants’ omissions are causally peripheral in the 
context of a discussion of how the courts reduce the incidence of the duty of care in 
negligence cases by refusing to find a duty where the claimant could have done more 
to protect herself from the harm she suffered. The operative considerations are ones of 
policy and morality. As a matter of policy, it is desirable to confine the deterrent 
effects of the duty of care to those able most easily to avoid harm, be they claimants 
who can help themselves or third parties. At the same time, it is desirable to protect 
deep-pocketed defendants, often public authorities, from the excessive liability that 
might attach to them if they were required to protect claimants from their own or third 
parties’ negligence. As a matter of morality, to make many people potentially liable 
for the negligence of a third party would represent a vast inhibition on freedom. The 
latter consideration is simply the first of Lord Hoffmann’s two reasons for the 
omissions principle. As we have seen, it can be overridden if a duty of care can be 
based on a public authority’s public law powers and duties. The former considerations 
are examples of the type of policy argument that can limit the incidence of the duty of 
care whether or not it can be based on a public authority’s public law powers and 
duties. None of these considerations undermine the basic proposition that there are 
reasons for making an exception to the omissions principle in relation to public 
authorities that do not pertain in relation to private persons. 
 
 
                                                 
51
 Feinberg n 30 above p 180; HLA Hart and T Honoré Causation in the Law (2nd ed, OUP, 1985) p 30 
n 4 and accompanying text, p 38,  p 140. 
 
52
  See e.g. HLA Hart and T Honoré n 51 above, pp 2, 5, 16, 30-31, 37-38, 50, 59, 62, 81, 127-28, 138-
141, 236; Feinberg n 30 above pp 165-85; J Stapleton ‘Choosing What We Mean by Causation in the 
Law’ (2008) 73 Missouri Law Review 433, 435-37; J Stapleton ‘Unnecessary Causes’ (2013) 129 LQR 
39, 40; J Stapleton ‘An “Extended But-For” Test for the Causal Relation in the Law of 
Obligations’(2015) 35 OJLS 697, 699, 705, 709.  Stapleton convincingly refutes Michael Moore’s 
claim (made for example in ‘Causation and Responsibility’ (1999) 16 Social Philosophy and Policy 1) 
that omissions cannot be causes in the first article of hers referred to in this footnote at p 467. 
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B. Honoré’s Defence of the Act/Omission Distinction 
 
In his article on public authority liability for omissions, Nolan invokes Honoré’s 
argument that omissions are in general less harmful than acts.54 Prior to making 
reference to it, Nolan considers briefly the individual liberty and ‘why pick on me’ 
justifications for the omissions principle set out by Lord Hoffmann in Stovin.55 
Neither apply to public authorities, Nolan agrees, but nor are they good justifications 
for the principle: they do not satisfactorily explain, for example, why an ordinary 
private person should not be liable for an omission to act in circumstances in which to 
act would not be unduly burdensome and in which there are no or few other people 
who could render the assistance required. But, Nolan continues, there are more 
convincing justifications for the differential treatment of acts and omissions and he 
cites Honoré’s argument ‘that in general harmful abstentions are less culpable than 
wrongful acts, because while the latter constitute inroads on security, the former 
threaten only the expectation of improvement, a different and secondary value.’  
Nolan asserts that in the light of this argument, we can conclude that ‘there is no 
justification for distinguishing between public authorities and private parties when it 
comes to failures to confer benefits and that therefore Gorringe represents a welcome 
rationalisation of the law.’56  
 
What exactly is Honoré’s argument and does it have the effect ascribed to it by 
Nolan? It is true that Honoré’s fundamental claim in his article is that harmful acts are 
worse than harmful omissions and that this claim is made on the grounds Nolan 
mentions. It is very hard to find anything in the article that supports the claim, 
however. We saw above that Honoré makes a sound and illuminating distinction 
between the background duties that each of us owes to everyone else and the distinct 
duties that arise in particular relationships: we have background duties to refrain from 
harming others but we do not necessarily have background duties to act so as to help 
others, whereas we may owe distinct duties to help as well as not to harm and, in this 
latter context, an omission may be worse than a harmful act; distinct duties, moreover, 
generally take priority over background ones. This is the solid framework of Honoré’s 
article. Onto it he grafts the argument about harmful acts being worse than harmful 
omissions. What is the relationship between the framework and the argument that 
Honoré superimposes upon it? Are we to understand that harmful acts are worse than 
harmful omissions at the level of background duties, at the level of distinct duties or 
both? 
 
If the argument is intended to show only that harmful acts are worse than harmful 
omissions – and more of a threat to security - at the level of background duties then it 
tells us nothing that is not already revealed in the original framework. This can be 
seen if we consider an example that Honoré seems to think supports his security 
argument. He says that someone who drops litter is more culpable than someone who 
fails to pick up the same litter even though the harm caused and the likely effort that 
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would be required to do the right thing would be the same in each case.57 But here 
Honoré is comparing two background duties: the duty that a citizen owes to society as 
a whole not to drop litter and the duty that a citizen owes to society as a whole to pick 
up someone else’s litter. The greater culpability of breach of the former duty can be 
explained by the second, ‘why pick on me’ justification for the original point about 
background duties. We can see this more clearly if we make a comparison of the 
relative culpability of someone who drops litter with someone whose job it is to pick 
up the litter and who fails to do so, thus breaching a distinct duty.  Here it is much less 
clear that a harmful act is worse than a harmful omission. 
 
If, on the other hand, Honoré’s security argument is supposed to show that harmful 
acts are worse than harmful omissions where those omissions are breaches of distinct 
duties, then it simply contradicts what is said elsewhere in the article. Honoré says 
very little to support the idea that this is the purpose of the argument. He does give in 
passing an example consistent with the assumption that it is so: he suggests that a 
wage cut is worse than the failure to receive a pay rise.58 But upon examination this 
example tends to support the view, advanced earlier in the article by Honoré himself, 
that in the context of distinct duties an omission may be just as bad as an act. Whether 
or not receiving a wage cut is worse than not receiving a pay rise depends entirely on 
the context and what one has been led to expect. If you work in a company that has 
been doing badly because of the recession and the necessity of a pay cut has been 
discussed and the pay cut then turns out to be only 5% of your income, you may be 
relieved. If, by contrast, you were confidently expecting a Christmas bonus worth 
10% of your income and you have already bought expensive Christmas presents on 
that assumption then you may be gravely disappointed with a bonus worth only 5% of 
your salary. Examples of pairwise comparisons of this sort, demonstrating that in the 
context of distinct duties an omission may be as damaging to security as an act, can be 
multiplied indefinitely.59 
 
The whole idea that acts represent more of a threat to security than omissions is, 
moreover, contradicted by what Honoré says earlier in the article in establishing the 
framework. Having set out the view that bodily movement counts as intervention in 
the world while non-movement does not he writes: 
 
But superimposed on this picture of the world is a refinement of it, which 
treats disruptions of the normal course of events as similar to interventions 
which bring about change, though the change is not now a change in the 
existing state of affairs but rather in the normal or expected sequence of 
events. The regular course of things may take the form not only of recurrent 
natural events, but of regular human conduct such as clearing the street when 
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 One person is injured by the negligent driving of a motorist, another in a train crash caused by the 
negligent failure to maintain the track; a haemophiliac loses blood on one occasion because someone 
carelessly cuts her and on another because she cuts herself and the ambulance she calls fail to arrive; 
one landowner suffers the burning of his crops because his neighbour carelessly allows fire to spread 
from his land, another suffers the burning of his crops because his neighbour flicks a cigarette on to 
them while mending the fence between the two properties; and so on. 
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the snow stops falling. If this regular or expected conduct fails to occur, then 
failure counts not, as the first world-view would suggest, as a non-intervention 
but rather, on a wider view of what amounts to change, as a sort of 
intervention in the world. If, as is often…the case, the break in routine violates 
a norm (the person who does not sweep up the snow may or may not have a 
duty to do so), it is a form of not-doing which amounts to an omission and is a 
potential ground of responsibility.60 
 
This passage forms part of an explanation of how omissions can count as 
interventions in the world and thus give rise to liability. But it does more than this. It 
supports Honoré’s contention that where there are distinct duties, omissions may be as 
bad as acts – to cause someone to slip and hurt herself by failing to clear away snow 
when one is under a duty to do so may be as bad as causing someone to slip by 
dropping a banana skin - and it shows that the maintenance of our security depends as 
much on people who owe us duties acting as we are entitled to expect (i.e. on their not 
harming us by their omissions) as it does on their refraining from positively acting so 
as to cause us harm.61 We rely for our security as much on the performance of their 
duties by people who owe us positive duties to act as we do on people refraining from 
harming us. Society is a cooperative venture in which risky activities are undertaken 
and the risk is kept at an acceptable level both by requiring people to refrain from 
exacerbating the risk and by putting many people, including often public officials, 
under duties positively to act so as to avert, abate or minimise the risk. Our security 
rests on a pattern of expectations and if there is harm to it, it is as likely to be because 
of the omission to act as positive action. 
 
There is thus nothing in Honoré’s article to support the contention that harmful acts 
threaten security more than harmful omissions and much – the sound part of the 
article - to contradict it. What if there were an argument, however, that showed that 
acts were more of a threat to security than  omissions? Nolan thinks the existence of 
such an argument shows that omissions by public authorities that are breaches of 
public law obligations and do not fall within one of the traditional exceptions to the 
omissions principle (as in the Stovin case) should not give rise to liability whereas 
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omissions that fall within one of traditional exceptions should. But an argument of 
this sort, if it existed, could just as well be taken to show that liability was 
inappropriate in the latter case as in the former. 
 
If we look again at Nolan’s presentation of Honoré’s argument (described in the first 
paragraph of this section) we can see that it contains a number of curious features. 
These are worth remarking upon because they are probably the expression of a more 
widely held viewpoint than Nolan’s alone. To begin with, in asserting that Lord 
Hoffmann’s explanation of the omissions principle is inadequate, Nolan clearly has in 
mind its inability to justify the refusal of liability in the case of easy rescue 
(‘circumstances in which to act would not be unduly burdensome and in which there 
are no or few other people who could render the assistance required’). As we have 
seen, however, to allow liability for easy rescue is not to negate the principle but 
merely to make another exception to it, an exception that can be justified, as can the 
more well established exceptions, on the ground that in the circumstances in question 
there is a distinct duty. Nolan’s view of the omissions principle involves treating the 
principle together with the well-established exceptions as a package, one whose 
contents are fixed and immutable.62 Hence he thinks that to step outside the principle 
and the established exceptions is to reject the principle altogether. He appears not to 
recognize that the principle must have a rationale capable of justifying the exceptions 
to it as well as the principle itself and that, if this is so, it must be possible to make 
new exceptions if they too can be justified by reference to the rationale. One can only 
arrive at this position by reifying the principle and its established exceptions i.e. by 
treating them as sacrosanct and only addressing the reasoning that supports them as an 
afterthought. 
 
 
 
 
6. Tofaris and Steel’s Position on Omissions 
 
Tofaris and Steel’s reasons for rejecting the act/omissions distinction in its application 
to the police are broadly similar to those I have advanced: that public authorities do 
not have an interest in freedom in the sense that private persons do; that imposing 
liability for an omission in a particular case – the one that interests the authors being 
that of the police failing to protect a citizen from violence – does not undermine the 
omissions principle as a whole; that the particular case they have an in mind involves 
a distinct duty and forms an exception to the omissions rule rather than undermining it 
altogether; and that the ‘why pick on me’ argument has no application to a public 
authority where the authority exists for providing the very assistance that it is being 
impugned for not providing. They emphasise this last point by referring at a number 
of points in their article to the police’s special status.63 This brings the police, and 
other public authorities, within the last exception to the principle as they formulate 
it.64 
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 Wilberg conceives of the principle in the same way: see n 7 above. 
 
63
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 See n 3 above. 
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While the arguments described in the previous paragraph resemble those I have made 
in this article, their authors do not apply them in the way that I would to the case that 
concerns them. If it is the status of the police that exempts them from the effects of 
the omissions principle then what does this status consist in? It consists, surely, in the 
fact that it is a public body charged with the task of protecting the public from crime 
and with special powers to enable it to perform this task. That being so, if the police 
are subject to duties in negligence to take care to positively assist citizens as well as to 
duties to take care not to harm them, it would be natural to regard these duties as 
continuous with or growing out of the duties and powers that define their status.  
 
Tofaris and Steel do not use this mode of argument, however, in trying to explain why 
the police in the Michael case should have been subject to a duty of care. Instead they 
adopt a curious roundabout procedure. They argue for the existence of a moral duty to 
take care to prevent reasonably foreseeable physical injury to others which, they 
claim, gives rise in turn to a legal duty.65 Then, in order to explain why this duty 
applies only to public authorities and not to private individuals, they refer back to 
their discussion of the omissions principle and argue that while the rationale that 
underpins it does not exclude imposition of a duty of care on public authorities such 
as the police, it does exclude its imposition on private persons.  
 
Two features of this argument are worth pointing out. Firstly, its roundabout character 
is odd. In considering the imposition on a landowner of a duty to take care to 
extinguish a fire on his land, or on a bar owner of a duty to prevent a drunk person 
from driving home, or on an employer of a duty to provide a safe system of work, it is 
not common practice to suggest a duty extending to all persons and then to try to 
narrow it down by reference to the fact that the putative defendant has a particular 
status while other persons do not.  Usually, exemption from the omissions principle 
and being subject to a duty of care are both treated as following from the defendant’s 
status. 
 
Secondly, in order to succeed, the argument must begin by ascribing to citizens 
generally an extremely extensive duty, one equivalent to the duty that the police are 
alleged to be under in Michael. Tofaris and Steel never say in terms that private 
individuals are under a prima facie duty to disarm persons carrying out dangerous 
attacks on third parties. This must be what they are implicitly assuming, however, 
because their method is to begin with a moral duty that applies to everyone and then 
to whittle it down until they arrive at the legally enforceable duty on the police that 
they are seeking. Nothing in their argument augments by reference to their special 
powers the duty to which the police are subject. It might be said that the assumed 
moral duty only applies in the first place to those able to disarm a dangerous attacker. 
But suppose a group of strong men were apprised of an attack taking place 
somewhere in their neighbourhood: would we consider them to be subject to a moral 
duty to intervene as strong as the duty to which the police are subject? It is worth 
noting, moreover, that the existence of the extremely extensive duty I refer to here is 
deduced from an argument in favour of a duty of easy rescue of the sort that might be 
owed to a child drowning in shallow water. How the authors get from a duty of easy 
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rescue to the much more onerous duty to protect someone from a dangerous criminal 
is never clear. 
 
Shortly after setting out the argument described above for a duty on the police to aid 
those in danger, the authors attempt to explain how its scope would be limited by 
reference to the police’s ‘special’ – i.e. public - legal powers.66 The end result is thus 
the same as that produced by the method of argument I suggested above was the 
correct one. One might ask, however: was it ever plausible to suggest that private 
individuals are under a prima facie duty to disarm persons carrying out dangerous 
attacks on third parties? And more generally: why was this circuitous method of 
argument adopted? 
 
The reason seems to be a fear of mixing private and public law. That this is so appears 
from the reasoning Tofaris and Steel use in order to rebut another argument against 
finding a duty of care in the case that concerns them.67 The argument, deriving from 
another article by Nolan, is that making private persons but not public authorities 
subject to the omissions principle would introduce an ‘alien public/private distinction’ 
into the common law.68 The authors response to this is to accept the premise of the 
argument (that introduction of the ‘alien’ distinction would be undesirable) but to 
insist that the differential treatment of public authorities and private persons is one 
licenced by private law. But what justification is there for this fear of mixing public 
and private? The two are not clearly differentiated in English law as they are in some 
other systems69 and collateral challenge, whereby the public law legality of some act 
or omission of a public authority is tested by means of a private law challenge is a 
familiar phenomenon.70 
 
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
If one assumes that a public authority’s public law powers and duties can form the 
basis of a duty of care, then the problem of omissions vanishes. The omissions 
principle does not cease to apply, but there are clear grounds for making an exception 
to it where an authority has failed to do the very thing that it exists to do vis-à-vis the 
claimant. If one assumes that a public authority’s public law powers and duties cannot 
form the basis of a duty of care, then a public authority can only be subject to liability 
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for its omission to act where the omission falls within one of the established 
exceptions: the authority falls, in effect, to be treated just as if it were a private person 
for the purposes of identifying the factors that weigh in favour of a duty of care. If one 
attempts, as Tofaris and Steel do, to appeal to a public authority’s status as a reason to 
make an exception to the omissions principle, then one is endorsing the position that a 
public authority’s public law powers and duties can form the basis of a duty of care 
even if one does not admit that this is what one is doing. 
 
The omissions principle is thus a red herring. The real issues are whether or not a duty 
of care can be based on a public authority’s public law power and duties, in the sense 
explained above, and whether such a duty should be excluded on policy grounds. 
It is a mistake to suppose that discussion of these matters can somehow be bypassed 
by focusing on the fact that where public authorities cause harm it is often by means 
of omissions. Honoré’s claim that harmful acts represent more of a threat to security 
than harmful omissions is unfounded and does nothing to gainsay this conclusion. It is 
also a mistake to suppose that  one could rely on a public authority’s status as a public 
authority as a reason for denying the applicability of the omissions principle without 
at the same time recognizing that the authority’s possession of public law powers and 
its subjection to public law duties form part of the reason for imposing on it a duty of 
care. 
 
What I have described as the real issue is a large one and I do not attempt to deal with 
it here. Indeed, I do not think it could be adequately dealt with in the space of a 
journal article. The elimination of the omissions question is simply a piece of 
housekeeping, to be undertaken as an adjunct to the larger task.71 
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